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Abstract 
The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) is working on 
a project known as the Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX).  This project is developing a 
high assurance computing component that will be evaluated at the Common Criteria (CC) 
Evaluation Assurance Level 7 (EAL7). The processes, documentation, source code, and 
other evidence to support the evaluation will be openly shared.  Documentation is a 
substantial part of this evidence. Although the CC does state documentation requirements 
for each EAL, related requirements are often spread across multiple families, and no 
summarization of documentation requirements is provided.  Therefore it was necessary to 
study the CC carefully to determine such requirements for EAL7.  A long list of required 
documents was developed.  However, the TCX project found that when starting from 
scratch there are particular documents, described herein, that are precursors to serious 
design work.  In addition, it was learned that interpretations of the CC, and the occasional 
terminology translation were required. 
1 Introduction 
The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) has been 
working on a project called the Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX).  The TCX project 
“will provide an openly distributed worked example of how high assurance trusted 
computing components can be built” [1].  One of the computing components that the 
TCX project will build is a small separation kernel that can enforce process and data 
separation. In addition, a reference trusted application will be built to use this kernel [2]. 
 
Assurance is a measurement of confidence that a system’s security features function as 
specified, and the likelihood that the system does not contain maliciously inserted code 
that provides unspecified behavior.  A high assurance system is one that can be trusted to 
store and process information of high value, while a low assurance system is one that 
should only be used to store and process low-value information. 
 
The motivation for the TCX project is the fact that few high assurance systems have ever 
been successfully completed or evaluated, and of these, they have all been proprietary.  
Thus, it is extremely difficult for those new to information assurance to learn how to 
construct high assurance systems. An objective of the TCX project is to provide the 
information that will allow more organizations to consider building high assurance 
products.  It is intended to remove the “mystery” of high assurance development through 
a worked example.  The contributors to the TCX project have not undertaken this project 
as novices, but rather have many years of experience in the commercial sector in the area 
of high assurance product development. 
 
The validation that a system is high assurance is provided via an independent third-party 
evaluation.  A key aspect of a high assurance evaluation is the documented 
methodologies, standards, and processes that are used throughout the product lifecycle.  
This paper describes the lessons learned in the TCX project while developing 
documentation prior to the engineering phase of development of a trusted component. 
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It should be noted that the conclusions reported here reflect the fact that the development 
group is small, and that the product being built is relatively small.  Larger projects may 
require modifications to these conclusions to best fit their needs and environment. 
2 Common Criteria 
The Common Criteria (CC) is an internationally recognized standard for security of 
computing products.  It is divided into three parts: Part 1, Introduction and general model; 
Part 2, Security functional requirements; and Part 3, Security assurance requirements [3].  
While Part 1 describes the overall approach to evaluation, Parts 2 and 3 provide the 
standards for the security features a product can have, and the assurance that those 
features behave as specified, respectively.  The focus of this paper is the documentation 
requirements in Part 3. 
 
The CC predefines seven different levels of assurance, known as Evaluation Assurance 
Levels (EALs), where EAL1 is the lowest assurance, and EAL7 is the highest assurance.  
The requirements of these 7 levels are carefully selected individual requirements from 
Part 3, where each higher EAL imposes additional constraints or additional new 
requirements beyond those of the adjacent lower level.  Thus, it is recognized that EALs 
1 through 4 are “low” assurance levels, while EALs 5 through 7 are “high” assurance 
levels.  To provide the maximum benefit as an example, it was decided that the TCX 
separation kernel will be targeted for an EAL7 evaluation.  The requirements for EAL7 
drove most of the documentation requirements. 
 
All the assurance requirements of the CC are divided into seven Assurance Classes, 
which can be thought of as different categories of assurance requirements “that share a 
common focus”, e.g., configuration management and vulnerability assessment [3].  These 
classes are broken down further into Assurance Families, and finally into individual 
components, “which is the smallest selectable set of requirements” [3].  The individual 
CC requirements are found in the component descriptions.  The seven different EALs 
have been defined by selecting components from the available families, as shown in 
Table 1, which is a reproduction from Part 3 of the CC.  Each number in the table 
represents a component.  Bold numbers represent additional requirements for that 
assurance family.  Each component consists of from several paragraphs to several pages 
of requirements. 
 
There is no simple reference, such as Table 1, to determine the overall documentation 
requirements for a given EAL.  The documentation requirements are interspersed among 
all the other assurance requirements, with related requirements sometimes spread across 
multiple families.  The only way to find the documentation requirements is to carefully 
read each component description that maps to the desired EAL, and merge the 
requirements together.  Even then, some of the wording is vague and must be interpreted.  
In addition, the semantics of some of the terminology used in the CC was not the same as 
that of other standards with which the TCX team was familiar.  In an attempt to minimize 
the risk of erroneous interpretation, the Common Methodology for Information 
Technology Security Evaluation (CEM) document was referenced from time to time [4].  
The CEM document provides guidance to evaluators, and occasionally provides insight 
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into what the authors of the CC were thinking when they wrote the requirements.  
However, the CEM only provides guidance for low assurance evaluations (EAL4 and 
below).  There is no corresponding guidance for high assurance evaluations, so some of 
the requirements for the high assurance EALs are not covered.  An update to the CC 
during the development of the TCX requirements made this effort even more difficult. 
 
Assurance Components by 
Evaluation Assurance Level Assurance class 
Assurance 
Family EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7 
ACM_AUT    1 1 2 2 
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 Configuration management 
ACM_SCP   1 2 3 3 3 
ADO_DEL  1 1 2 2 2 3 Delivery and 
operation ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4 
ADV_HLD  1 2 2 3 4 5 
ADV_IMP    1 2 3 3 
ADV_INT     1 2 3 
ADV_LLD    1 1 2 2 
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 
Development 
ADV_SPM    1 3 3 3 
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Guidance 
documents AGC_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALC_DVS   1 1 1 2 2 
ALC_FLR        
ALC_LCD    1 2 2 3 
Life cycle 
support 
ALC_TAT    1 2 3 3 
ATE_COV  1 2 2 2 3 3 
ATE_DPT   1 1 2 2 3 
ATE_FUN  1 1 1 1 2 2 Tests 
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 
AVA_CCA     1 2 2 
AVA_MSU   1 2 2 3 3 
AVA_SOF  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Vulnerability 
assessment 
AVA_VLA  1 1 2 3 4 4 
 
Table 1:  Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level Summary [3] 
3 Required Documents 
After studying the CC components, it was determined that over 40 documents are 
required for an EAL7 evaluation.  As overwhelming as that may sound, it was determined 
that only the following short list of documents need to be in place before development 
starts: 
• Documentation Standards 
• Life Cycle Plan 
• Configuration Management Plan 
• Configuration Management Procedures 
• Configuration Items List 
• Personnel Security Plan 
 |  T e c h n i c a l  R e p o r t  N P S - C S - 0 6 - 0 0 7  
   The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research 4 
• Physical Security Plan 
• Software Development Standards 
 
Failure to develop such documents prior to system development would render any 
attempt for a high assurance rating fruitless. They cannot be written post facto as an 
exercise to fulfill all high assurance requirements because the opportunity to have them 
contribute to system assurance is gone.  Organizations that hope to receive a high 
assurance rating for a product must demonstrate that it was developed using industry best 
practices, and they must provide evidence that the practices were actually followed from 
the beginning of the product lifecycle.  Thus, the documentation not only describes what 
must be done, but also describes how evidence shall be created and maintained for the 
evaluators. 
 
During an evaluation, one of the first things that an evaluator will want to determine is 
whether the stated methodologies, policies and standards were good enough to qualify for 
the desired rating.  Once that test is passed, the next thing an evaluator will want to see is 
proof that the organization actually adhered to them.  Therefore, when writing any of the 
documents listed above, the author must continually ask the question: “How will I prove 
that I did all the things I said I was going to do?”  In other words, what evidence will be 
needed to show that the stated methodologies, policies and standards were strictly 
followed from the start of development? 
 
Another challenge for the developer is knowing when enough is enough.  It is possible to 
go beyond the mark when considering how to meet all the requirements and do more than 
the minimum necessary for the desired rating.  The evaluators will award the desired 
rating in such a case, but it will be at a greater cost to the developer than was necessary.  
Therefore, another question to keep asking is, “Is this too much?”  It was valuable for the 
TCX documentation effort to have some team members keep asking this question.   
 
It should also be noted that when the CC describes a documentation requirement, it does 
not mean that it must be met by a specific separate document – multiple documentation 
requirements can be met by a single document.   
4 Documentation Standards 
The first document that should be written is the Documentation Standards.  This will 
define the look and feel of documents, the file format, etc.  Otherwise, if left until later, 
the initial documents might need to be revised, wasting a significant amount of time and 
effort. 
5 Life Cycle Plan 
The next document that should be created is the Life Cycle Plan, because it provides the 
framework for how the product must be designed, built, upgraded, and potentially retired.  
Additionally, it describes the overall philosophy of development, and how all 
development activities fit together, especially with respect to the CC documentation 
requirements. 
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Among other things, all required documents must be described in the Life Cycle Plan, 
and when they are to be produced in the development process.  Dependencies on other 
documentation should also be shown.  It was found to be very helpful to break down the 
life cycle into phases, and then to break down the phases into activities.  This allows the 
plan to show which items are required to start the activity, i.e., its inputs, and which items 
are produced by the activity, i.e., its outputs.  The phases and activities defined for the 




Product Definition Conceive 
Requirements Definition 
Product Design Design 
Detailed Design 
Implementation 
Testing, Composition and 
Validation 
Build 




Table 2:  Life Cycle Phases and Activities 
 
As noted earlier, there may be a need to “interpret” certain CC requirements.  Such 
interpretations should be documented in the Life Cycle Plan.  One vague statement that 
caused much debate within the TCX project was the EAL7 requirement for a 
“standardized and measurable life-cycle model” [CC].  The words “measurable” and 
“model” do not seem to go together because a model is an abstraction and not a 
measurable item.  In the end, this requirement was interpreted to mean that the “model 
must be simple enough to be able to identify (i.e., measure) the project’s current status, 
with respect to the model” [5].  Having stated inputs and outputs for each activity makes 
it easy to determine the status of a project, with respect to the development model.  Table 
3 shows a list of the required CC documents for EAL7 and the activity that produces 
them. 
 
In addition to the interpretation issues, there is the potential for inconsistent use of 
terminology between an organization and the CC.  Such confusion must be dealt with in 
the Life Cycle Plan. One approach is to replace the CC terminology with the 
organization’s terminology, but this can be very confusing for those who may refer to the 
CC, and may cause confusion among the evaluators.  The terminology in the TCX 
documentation is consistent with CC usage, but to avoid confusion for internal personnel, 
strategic sidebar definitions were added to TCX documents. 
 
The Life Cycle Plan is critical to the success of an evaluation.  It must be written or 
revised with a good knowledge and understanding of all the CC requirements to ensure 
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that all the necessary documentation is generated at the right point in the development 
process. 
6 Configuration management 
After the Life Cycle Plan, the Configuration Management (CM) Plan should be 
developed.  This may seem out of order, since at this point there would be at least two 
documents ready for configuration management, but the TCX documentation experience 
has shown that the Life Cycle Plan, which provides input to the CM Plan, should be 
written first. 
 
The CM Plan describes the philosophy and high-level requirements for protecting 
configuration items after they have been developed.  The plan needs to provide the 
framework so the following questions can be answered: 
• How do you know that management approved development of the code? 
• How do you know that the code submitted by a programmer implements the 
intended functionality? 
• How do you know that the completed source code was not changed after it was 
submitted? 
 
At some point in the development process, ideally in the Life Cycle Plan, the definition 
of a Configuration Item (CI) must be given.  The CC requirements refer to the control of 
a system in terms of Configuration Items, but it “leaves the contents of the configuration 
item list to the discretion of the developer” [3].  In other words, the CC does not mandate 
how an organization decides to organize the collection of objects that constitute its 
product.  For example, on one end of the spectrum a CI can be defined as a source file, 
and thus there would be many CIs.  On the other end of the spectrum a CI can be defined 
as an entire product, so that there would be only one CI. 
 
The disadvantage of having a lot of CIs is that it increases the administrative costs, 
because each time a change to any file is made, a review must be performed, and some 
amount of “paperwork” must be done to conform to the CM Plan.  The advantage, 
however, is that there is a greater sense of control because changes are reviewed more 
often, and those changes may be small enough in scope to review them with confidence.  
The disadvantage of having a very small number of CIs is that there is a sense of having 
less control over the changes that are made to a system.  An advantage is that fewer 
reviews are required.  The TCX project selected an approach that is in between these two 
extremes, where a software CI is a subsystem, each document is a CI, third party tools are 
combined into one CI, etc. 
 
Once the CM Plan has provided the framework and policies for controlled modifications 
of CIs, the CM Procedures can be written to provide the detailed steps for CM 
implementation.  It should describe how new Configuration Items are submitted, and how 
changes to existing CIs are submitted to an approving body, such as a Change Control 
Board (CCB).  In addition, it must define the materials that the CCB will review when 
considering requests.  Finally, the CM Procedures need to specify the “paper trail” for all 
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Activity Documents Produced 
Life Cycle Management Plan 
Product Definition 
Configuration Management Plan 
Configuration Management Procedures 
Configuration Items List 
Personnel Security Plan 





Acceptance Plan / Acceptance Tests 
Protection Profile (if necessary) Requirements Definition 
Security Target (or in Detailed Design, depending on 
above) 
Formal TSP Model 
Functional Specification 
Formal Functional Specification Product Design 
Product Test Plan / Product Tests 
High-Level Design 
Formal High-Level Design 
Subsystem Test Plan / Subsystem Tests 
Low-Level Design 
Formal Low-Level Design 
Architectural Description 
Unit Test Plan / Unit Tests 
Detailed Design 
Covert Channel Analysis Plan 
Source Code 
Flaw Remediation Procedures 




Covert Channel Analysis 
Code Correspondence 
Vulnerability Analysis 
Subsystem and Product Test Results 
Guidance Documentation Analysis 




Installation Procedures Packaging and Delivery 
Integration Procedures 
Assurance Maintenance Plan 
TOE Component Categorization Report 
Evidence of Assurance Maintenance Maintenance 
Security Impact Analysis 
Retirement Retirement Announcement 
 
Table 3:  Document-to-Activity Matrix 
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After the CM Procedures have been written, the initial Configuration Items List can be 
produced.  If each document were considered to be an individual CI, then there would 
initially be at least five entries, consisting of the documents described so far, including 
the CI List itself.  At this point in the process, there is enough policy and procedure in 
place to submit these first five documents to the CCB for acceptance into and protection 
by the CM system. 
7 Personnel Security Plan 
A Personnel Security Plan must be written that describes the policies relevant to the 
people working on the project, to ensure the protection of the CIs.  The policies need to 
address the following kinds of issues:  
• Qualifications for assignment to the project (e.g., clearances, background checks, 
or citizenship). 
• Training of users, with respect to the security requirements of the project, 
including both initial training and annual refresher training. 
• How authorized users are managed on the project systems, such as the enabling 
and disabling of accounts. 
• How audits are to be performed to ensure that the policies are being followed. 
8 Physical Security Plan 
A Physical Security Plan must be written that describes the policies relevant to the 
physical security of the CIs.  The policies need to address the following kinds of issues: 
• The physical security of development and CM servers. 
• Integrity and confidentiality during transmission, such as on a network between 
development clients and servers. 
• Separation of duties and roles such that CM privileges are not given to 
developers, and vice versa. 
• Key and combination control. 
• Backup policy and protection. 
• Limitations on visitors. 
• Audits. 
9 Software Development Standards 
Before software can be designed and implemented, engineering standards must be agreed 
upon.  There are at least four parts to this document, though other standards can be added, 
as seen fit by the organization: 
• The Review Process 
• The Review Evidence 
• Coding Standards 
• Testing Standards 
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The review process describes how a CI shall be examined at critical stages during its 
development.  For the TCX project, six review steps were defined for a CI during its 
development before it can be submitted to the CCB: 
• Requirement Review 
• Preliminary Design Review (PDR) 
• Critical Design Review (CDR) 
• Peer Review 
• Acceptance Review 
• Final Review 
 
The Software Development Standards define what each review step must accomplish, 
and who is involved in the review.  A critical part of this process is the review evidence, 
to show that the strict process was followed for the life of each CI. 
 
Standardized coding practices must be documented.  Each language has its own features 
that must be standardized, but the following provides a list that applies to all high-level 
languages: 
• Commenting and Readability 
• The use of Constants and Macros 
• Header and footer requirements for files and functions 
• Date formats 
• Naming conventions 
One of the review steps must verify that these standards were adhered to, such as the Peer 
Review.  
 
Lastly, standards with respect to the testing of CIs must be stated. 
 
If hardware components will be designed, then either a separate Hardware Development 
Standard needs to be written, or hardware and software standards can be combined into 
one Development Standards document. 
10 Summary 
Despite the fact that there are a large number of documentation requirements for a high 
assurance CC evaluation, our experience has revealed there are only eight documents that 
must be written before development can start.  However, for a variety of reasons, when 
starting from scratch, these eight documents will take some significant time to develop, 
especially if one is not familiar with the CC.  Careful thought must go into these 
documents because they form the whole framework for a high assurance environment, 
and provide the evidence that a product has earned a high assurance rating.  The one 
difficult interpretation of the CC for EAL7 is the requirement for a “standardized and 
measurable life-cycle model” [3]. 
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